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PART I: THE DATA RETENTION ACT
In April 2015, the Australian government passed the Telecommunications (Interception and
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act, which requires Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and
telecommunications providers to store information about their subscribers’ online activity for a
period of two years. The data retention rules apply to metadata – loosely defined as information
that is not the 'content' of a communication. Generally, service providers must keep identifying
information about their subscribers, including billing information, and information about the
type, time, duration and location of communications. The act excludes much internet activity
and web browsing history. Information must be stored for two years for most information and
must be encrypted and stored securely. The act enables approved law enforcement agencies to
access this data without a warrant, except for the specific case of data relating to journalists.
The final text of the act is complex, confusing, and lacks key safeguards to protect the privacy of
Australians. In part II of this article, we review the obligations imposed by the act and the
mechanisms  that  have  been  introduced  to  protect  human  rights.  Experience  from  other
jurisdictions and the recommendations of Australian reviews suggest that mass data retention
obligations can only be justified if they are clearly necessary and curtailed to limit access to data
for the purposes of addressing serious crimes with full judicial oversight. The act, as passed,
does not contain these safeguards, and important terms are not defined in the act or are defined
only in the negative or in explanatory materials.
Public interest concerns were raised consistently throughout the period in which the bill was
under consideration, but were ultimately not directly addressed by the government. In part III,
we review the history of the act’s introduction as represented in the Australian press media, in
order to better understand how the act was passed without resolving these core human rights
tensions. The final text of the act reflects the trauma the government suffered during its passage,
resulting in a number of very specific limitations that address the most acute and politically
problematic concerns raised by opponents. The larger-scale concerns about the necessity of
introducing  mass-scale  surveillance  obligations  or  the  scheme's  uncertain  scope,  vague
specification of access rights, and limited judicial oversight, however, were not well represented
in the media. Our analysis suggests that the government was able to exploit the complex and
uncertain scope of the data retention obligations in its favour to marginalise opposition that
hinged on quite technical questions of coverage and access. The government was also able to
draw heavily on escalating national security rhetoric around several high-profile terrorist attacks
to effectively sidestep scrutiny about why the new obligations were required. Ultimately, while
the government had to make several concessions to particular interest groups, it was able to
avoid substantively addressing key concerns about the scheme in the media by channelling
attention to the more easily answered question about whether the proposed data set would be
included in  the  legislation.  Many of  the  issues  raised  during  the  passage  of  the  act  were
effectively deferred to be resolved at a future date, either by a review committee or through
ministerial regulations, giving the government the time it needed to secure bipartisan support
for its passage.
PART II: NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE
The data retention act introduces highly complex obligations and a set of outstanding issues that
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have not fully been resolved. In this part, we consider some of the key issues with the act from
the perspective of the human right to privacy, generally represented in international documents
as the right not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with privacy, family life, home and
correspondence (UDHR 1948, Art 12; ICCPR 1966, Art 17; CFREU 2000, Art 7). According to
international human rights law, in order for a data retention regime to be legitimate, it must be
both necessary to address a legitimate goal and be a proportionate means to achieving that goal.
In this part,  we argue that the government has not discharged its  burden of showing that
Australia’s  data  retention  obligation  is  a  necessary  measure,  and  that  it  has  not  been
appropriately tailored to satisfy the requirements of proportionality.
Australia’s  data  retention scheme comes during a  period of  great  international  scrutiny of
indiscriminate surveillance regimes (Brown et al., 2015). Edward Snowden’s revelations of the
extent of surveillance of global internet traffic captured by the Five Eyes alliance (of which
Australia is a member) have fuelled intense concern about how the technical capabilities of
intelligence and law enforcement agencies can be limited in a way that  ensures individual
liberties are adequately protected (Greenwald, 2014).
Opinions differ as to whether and how a metadata retention scheme can be compatible with
freedom of expression and privacy rights. The strongest statements, like the 'necessary and
proportionate' (2014) principles developed by a coalition of civil rights societies, academics and
privacy and technology experts, prohibit completely the indiscriminate collection of metadata.
The UN and Inter-American Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression (2013) have warned
that access to telecommunications data should only be authorised under the 'most exceptional
circumstances'.  The European Court  of  Justice  (ECJ) has held that  an indiscriminate data
retention obligation went beyond what was necessary and proportionate to achieve its objectives
to fight ‘serious crimes’ and was therefore incompatible with the fundamental right to privacy
and to data protection (Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications, 2014). Similar to
the Australian scheme,  the European Directive  2006/24/EC required providers  of  publicly
available  electronic  communications  services  or  public  communications  networks  to  retain
‘traffic and location data’ – though not ‘the content of electronic communications’ – for periods
between six months and two years (articles 2, 5, 6). The object of the directive was to ensure that
data was available for the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, including
acts  of  terrorism (article  1;  Digital  Rights  Ireland  [41]-[42]).  The ECJ found that  fighting
serious crime and international terrorism to maintain international peace and security was an
objective  of  general  interest  (Digital  Rights  Ireland  [41]-[42]).  However,  given  that  the
directive’s interference with the right to privacy was ‘wide-ranging’, ‘serious’ and likely to make
people feel as though their private lives were subject to constant surveillance ([37]), the data
retention had to be proportional and strictly necessary to achieve this objective. The ECJ held
that it was not. In so holding, the court focused in particular on the fact that the scheme would
affect all persons using electronic communications services, regardless of their connection to
criminal activity ([58]); that the directive contained no objective criteria by which to determine
the limits of the access and use of retained data by competent national authorities in detecting,
preventing or prosecuting serious crime ([60]);  that the directive did not provide for prior
review by a court or independent administrative body ([62]); and that there were insufficient
safeguards to  ensure the effective  protection of  retained data  against  the  risk  of  abuse or
unlawful access ([66]). 1 As we highlight below, Australia’s own data retention act shares these
same shortcomings.
In the United States, a presidential review of surveillance recommended that access to data must
be strictly limited to national security interests and permitted only with a court order (Review
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Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 2013). In the US, where warrantless
access to metadata about citizens' behaviour raises serious legal and constitutional concerns
(Donohue, 2014), a Presidential Policy Directive (2014) requires even surveillance targeted at
non-US persons to be used only in relation to national security, cybersecurity, and transnational
crime. While it is hard to articulate a definitive standard as to when data retention regimes will
be proportionate (Brown et al., 2015), a minimal baseline seems relatively clear: measures that
are justifiable on national security grounds may not be justifiable for ordinary law enforcement
purposes, and access to metadata must be constrained by legitimate judicial authority. In this
part, we review Australia’s new data retention obligations against these standards.
A. SCOPE OF OBLIGATIONS
The scope of data that is required to be stored by telecommunications providers and internet
service providers is not clearly defined in Australia’s act. The act requires service providers to
store  identifying  information  about  the  subscriber,  their  billing  information,  address,  and
account details; the source, destination, time, and duration of communications; the type of
communication or service used by the subscriber, such as voice, SMS, email or social media (for
the type of communication) or Wi-Fi,  VoIP or cable (for the type of service);  and location
information at the start and end of communications (s 187AA(1)). This list can be changed at
any time by ministerial declaration, though a declaration is deemed to be in force only for 40
sitting days of parliament (s 187AA(2),(3)).
From this broad list of information, several distinct categories are excluded. The most important
of these is that the ‘contents or substance of a communication’ is not required to be stored (s
187A(4)(a)). The legislation also excludes details about what subscribers access over the internet
– service providers are not required to capture IP addresses of connections users make online
and other information that relates to services provided by third parties (called ‘over the top’
services) (s 187A(4)(b),(c)). The complex way that ‘over the top’ services are excluded creates an
unusual distinction in the Act where services that are provided by Australian ISPs themselves
will actually be included within the scope of the obligation. So, for example, if a subscriber
accesses email through a third party provider, like Google, or makes a call through a VoIP
service like Skype, these are ‘over the top’ services, and the provider is under no obligation to
retain any information about their use. But, where email or VoIP services are provided by the
ISP itself, it is required to store any information about the communications its users make –
including addresses to which emails are sent or calls placed. The situation is further complicated
by the fact that the providers to whom data retention obligations apply can be expanded by
declaration at a later date (s 187A(3B)) – which means that the minister or an authorised person
may  require  Australian  service  providers,  including  website  hosts,  company  intranets,
discussion forums, and other online services, to store data about their use.
The obligations imposed for mobile and fixed telephony communications are more extensive
than those imposed for internet traffic. Telecommunications providers are required to store
details about connections to the network and information about calls and messages sent over
the network. Information that is not 'content', in this respect, includes the number dialled or the
recipient of an SMS; the duration of a call; and the location of a mobile phone user at the start
and end of the call. The act excludes location information about a telecommunications device
where that information is not used by the service provider in providing the relevant service (s
187A(4)(e)) – for example, there is no obligation to store the reported GPS coordinates of a
mobile phone, only the location of the cell towers the phone is connected to.
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B. ACCESS TO METADATA
The broad scope of the Australian data retention regime raises a clear potential conflict with the
human right  to  privacy.  The regime requires  indiscriminate capture of  an extensive set  of
information that reveals important details of private communications - information that is itself
private.  Given the broad obligations to retain communications data,  the question of access
becomes crucial. Under previous law, a broad range of government agencies have been able to
access data held by telecommunications providers in the course of enforcing a criminal law or
imposing a monetary fine (Telecommunications Interception and Access Act 1979 (Cth), ss 178,
179).  The list  of  bodies that routinely use this power is  relatively large,  and includes local
councils,  animal  welfare  organisations,  Australia  Post,  and  various  federal  and  state
departments (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015). The Data Retention Act introduces a list
of  criminal  law-enforcement  agencies  that  is  substantially  narrower  than  the  diverse
organisations  that  were  previously  accessing  data,  and includes  police  services,  crime and
corruption commissions, customs, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC)
and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) (s110A(1)).
While  the  act,  as  introduced,  appears  to  limit  the  bodies  that  are  empowered  to  access
telecommunications data without a warrant, the list can be modified by ministerial declaration.
Documents obtained through freedom of information requests in January 2016 indicate that 61
different bodies had so far applied for ongoing access to telecommunications data (Guy, 2016).
This list represents a very diverse range of organisations, again including many government
departments,  some  local  councils,  and  a  broad  range  of  state  and  federal  regulators.  No
declaration has been made as yet as to which of these requests will be authorised, although
reportedly the Attorney-General’s Department has rejected at least one application - that of
Australia  Post,  which  sought  access  to  metadata  to  track  mobile  phones  stolen  from the
company’s retail stores (Taylor, 2016).
C. HUMAN RIGHTS SAFEGUARDS
The  potentially  broad  and  as  yet  unknown  list  of  agencies  that  are  able  to  access
telecommunications data without a warrant is concerning. Whether Australia’s data retention
scheme is proportionate essentially rests on the extent to which it is curtailed to achieving a
legitimate purpose. The government has consistently justified the data retention scheme to the
Australian public on the basis that it is vital to assist in national security investigations and
matters of serious crime. The risk posed by the act, however, is that the massive volume of data
that is requires to be created and maintained will, once it exists, be open to access by a wide
range of bodies for a wide range of other purposes, without the judicial oversight that a warrant
would require.
These concerns were raised by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR)
in its review of the scheme. The committee concluded that the government had not yet clearly
demonstrated that the obligation to store data for two years was necessary (PJCHR, 2014). This
hurdle is important, given that Australia already has a data preservation scheme, enacted in
2012. The Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Act ratified Australia's accession to the Council
of  Europe Convention on Cybercrime and introduced a scheme to permit law enforcement
agencies to require carriage service providers to preserve communications data for specified
persons in relation to both domestic and foreign investigations. The government has provided
no clear explanation as to why this existing data preservation scheme was inadequate.
Even assuming the scheme was necessary, the lack of judicial oversight over which agencies can
access data and for what purposes is concerning. The government, in asserting that the act
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complies  with  human  rights  standards  (Explanatory  Memorandum,  2015),  relies  on  the
procedural safeguards in the decision as to whether to grant an organisation’s request to become
an authorised agency.  These safeguards require the minister to consider a range of  issues,
including whether the organisation is likely to protect the information it receives and whether
the declaration would be in the public interest. Ultimately, however, the scope for ministerial
discretion is relatively large in this regard, and many of the bodies that have previously accessed
telecommunications data would potentially be able to satisfy the test under the new legislation.
There is accordingly good reason to suspect that in operation, Australia’s data retention scheme
will  be used not  just  for  the purpose of  investigating serious crimes and national  security
matters,  but  also  for  a  wide  range  of  much more  minor  criminal  offences  and regulatory
penalties.
The other safeguard the government points to in justifying the scheme is that the act requires
reporting mechanisms. The act requires agencies that access telecommunications information to
keep records and make annual reports detailing the number of times that the agency accessed
telecommunications  information  during  that  year.  These  reports  are  then  tabled  before
parliament (ss 186, 186A). Additionally, the Commonwealth Ombudsman is given power to
inspect the records kept by agencies, and is likewise under a responsibility to report to the
minister each year about these inspections. Again, the minister must table the ombudsman’s
report in parliament. A separate provision requires the minister to make an annual written
report on the operation of the data retention scheme.
While reporting after access is important for parliamentary oversight, it is no substitute for
judicial oversight before access to information. The PJCHR recommended that a warrant be
required for access to metadata, and that access be limited to investigations of serious crimes. It
considered that the act's oversight mechanisms were insufficient, in that they only required
reporting on access powers after they had already been exercised and after a person's privacy
had been violated (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2014).
Ultimately, the concerns raised by the PJCHR were mostly rejected by the government. In his
response to the PJCHR, the Attorney General disagreed with the 'suggestion' that agencies be
required  to  obtain  a  warrant  to  access  metadata.  Minister  Brandis  argued that  a  warrant
requirement would be 'impractical',  noting, 'Warrant applications take considerable time to
develop, which necessarily delays investigations and creates a risk that perishable physical,
electronic and testimonial evidence will be lost' (PJCHR, 2015, p. 66).
In light of the large scope of Australia's data retention obligations, widespread potential use, and
lack  of  judicial  oversight,  it  seems difficult  to  accept  that  the  government  has  sufficiently
demonstrated that it is a necessary and proportionate response. Importantly, Australia’s act
contains all  of  the same weaknesses that rendered the European Directive 2006/24/EC an
unacceptable  interference  with  the  right  of  privacy  in  the  Digital  Rights  Ireland decision
outlined above (Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications, 2014). In introducing
and  justifying  the  act,  the  Australian  government  relied  heavily  on  rhetoric  surrounding
increasing threats to national security and the need for more efficient criminal investigation for
serious crimes. Even assuming that the legislation is necessary on these grounds, its operation is
not limited to serious crimes. Most particularly, in its response to the PJCHR, the government
has  not  given  a  convincing  explanation  that  agencies  investigating  more  minor  crimes  or
regulatory  fines  might  need  access  to  telecommunications  data  without  a  warrant.  In  the
remainder of this article, we consider how the government was able to reject these human rights
concerns in securing the passage of the act.
The passage of Australia’s data retention regime: national security, human rights, and
media scrutiny
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 7 March 2017 | Volume 6 | Issue 1
PART III: THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE POLITICAL
PROCESS
In this part, we proceed from the position that civil society has an interest in ensuring that laws
imposing surveillance are necessary and proportionate to the harm that they are trying to
prevent. With this in mind, we examine what went wrong with the Australian data retention
scheme. The concerns with the act discussed in the previous part were all raised by journalists,
cross-bench senators,  and public  interest  groups  throughout  the  entire  period of  the  act's
introduction. The act was introduced during a period of great global hostility to government
surveillance following Edward Snowden's revelations of the extent to which the United States
National Security Agency (NSA) and its Five Eyes allies were able to capture internet data. The
European Court of Justice had only months previously rejected as violating EU law the scheme
upon which the Australian Bill  was explicitly  based (Digital  Rights Ireland v Minister for
Communications, 2014). The government's introduction of the act was bungled, in that neither
the Prime Minister nor the Attorney General could explain what 'metadata' meant, and the
government continually  struggled to  articulate  the justifications that  made its  introduction
necessary. From the time at which its introduction was first mooted, opinion polls showed that
over half of Australians surveyed opposed the act (Murphy, 2014).
The fact that the act was passed with only minor concessions to the public interest concerns in
these  circumstances  suggests  a  clear  limitation  in  the  ability  of  civil  society  to  influence
Australian law making. This is deeply problematic, particularly given that Australia lacks any
constitutionally entrenched protection for individual privacy rights. The Australian judiciary
accordingly  do not  have the tools  to  protect  the human rights  of  Australian citizens from
encroachment by the legislature in the same way that EU and US courts have been able to limit
the overly-broad collection of metadata. In the Australian legal system, it is the representative
parliament that is the primary safeguard of the rights of Australians.
In the remainder of this paper, we seek to understand in more detail how the legislation was
passed, and how public interest concerns were addressed during this time. To do so, we look
particularly  at  reports  in mainstream media outlets,  through which we examine reports  of
political compromises that were required to secure bipartisan support of the final legislation.
The analysis below finds that during the legislative process, the human rights concerns raised by
a small group of dissenting voices were not well amplified in the mainstream media. Unlike the
much more concentrated complaints of other groups, these concerns were never well addressed
by legislators. At least in this case, we show that the legislative process is not well suited to
ventilating human rights concerns. This analysis suggests that if human rights of Australians are
to  be  more  effectively  protected,  the  judiciary  should  be  empowered  to  review legislation
through constitutionally entrenched rights.
In this part, we review how the act was discussed in the mainstream media from the time it was
mooted to the time it was finally passed. We present a qualitative analysis of 1,689 news articles
and opinion pieces published in Australian mainstream media outlets and high profile online
sources over the period from 1 August 2014 to the passage of the Act on 26 March 2015. Articles
were  collated  through  the  Factiva  news  index,  searching  on  the  term  'data  retention'  or
'metadata', for all Australian sources, with duplicates removed. We then inductively analysed
each of these articles, coding thematically to identify the key actors and examine how these
controversies played out in the popular press over the course of the bill's introduction and
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passage through federal parliament. We focus in this article on the two key themes dealt with
above – necessity: how the scheme was justified in the national media; and proportionality: how
the scheme would be tailored to protect individual privacy interests.
The first thing to note about voices that were represented in the mainstream media is that the
conversation was dominated, from the outset and across the eight months we examined, by
government  MPs  and  representatives  from  the  federal  law  enforcement  and  intelligence
agencies. There was strongly worded, relatively consistent opposition from civil society groups
and a small number of cross-bench senators throughout the period, but even combined, these
voices were present at  rates far fewer – roughly half  – than government voices,  and were
generally proportionally better represented in the technology and independent press than the
larger mainstream outlets. Members of the Labor opposition are represented at similar rates,
but they are generally much more reserved in their critiques of the government’s proposal. The
telecommunications groups,  by comparison,  are  quite  muted throughout  the entire  period.
While the industry body Communications Alliance is at times critical about the costs of the
scheme for telecommunications providers, it and the larger telecommunications providers it
represents declared their general support early in the debate. Only a small number of ISPs -
most particularly iiNet - maintained any real public opposition to the scheme.
A. CONTENT AND METADATA
The lack of clarity around the new regime initially galvanised opposition but was eventually a
key factor in the act’s successful passage. From the point at which the government announced
plans to introduce a data retention regime, the definition of what it  would cover has been
controversial. Over a few days in early August 2014, both the Prime Minister and the Attorney
General struggled to articulate what exactly the term 'metadata' meant. Tony Abbott, Prime
Minister at  the time, told the Nine Television Network that the scheme would include the
addresses of websites that Australians visit (‘It’s not what you're doing on the internet, it's the
sites you're visiting, it's not the content, it's the sites [where] you've been’). His office later
clarified that this was not, in fact, within the scope of the scheme: ‘The government requires a
lawful warrant to look at Australians' web-browsing history. This is not metadata, it’s content.’
(Grubb  &  Massola,  2014)  Later  that  same  day,  Attorney-General  George  Brandis,  in  a
notoriously disastrous interview with Sky News, also struggled to explain metadata. The Senator
appeared to confirm that the addresses of the websites that users visit would in fact be captured.
Abbott and Brandis were widely ridiculed on mainstream and social  media following these
blunders.  By  Friday,  then  Communications  Minister  Malcolm  Turnbull  was  much  more
emphatic – speaking to ABC Radio, he explained that metadata would not include the addresses
of websites that users browse. Instead, Minister Turnbull noted, the scheme would only extend
to a subscriber's connection information – the IP address allocated to the subscriber by their ISP
– and associated information. This distinction, finally, was also confirmed by the Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in a show of
unified force.
Turnbull’s efforts to limit the damage caused by the fumbled interviews, rapidly deployed across
a large range of media, were only partially effective. These few days in August set the stage for a
great deal of confusion over the distinctions between 'metadata' and 'content' over the next six
months. The massive attention focused on the scheme in its first week gave rise to one of the
most persistent demands by commentators: that the government define, with some precision,
exactly what would be caught by the scheme. Hundreds of articles in the mainstream press
picked up the story over the next two weeks, and strong opinion pieces came out for and against
data retention. A small group of journalists from independent and technology publications, and
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technology journalists in mainstream outlets, vocally and consistently criticised the lack of detail
in the scheme and the confusion about what it would actually cover. The government did not
release clarification of what the scheme would cover until an industry discussion paper was
leaked in late  August  2014 (Grubb,  2014).  This  discussion paper specifically  excluded web
browsing history, but set up the complex table of information that was to be retained in a form
similar to the one in the final act.
The complexity of the scheme's scope limited the clarity and effectiveness of public debate. This
uncertainty  was eventually  exploited by the  government  to  its  advantage.  By the  time the
government introduced the bill into parliament, on 30 October 2014, Minister Turnbull was able
to  characterise  the  retention  of  web  browsing  history  as  the  key  privacy  concern.  The
government was then able to answer, simply and directly, that this was excluded from the scope
of the regime in the draft data set specification released on 31 October 2014. Examination of the
bill was immediately referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
(PJCIS). This committee was much more likely to support the bill than the PJCHR; the PJCIS is
focused on security, not human rights, and is comprised only of parliamentarians from the two
major parties and none of the cross-bench senators or the Labor figures who had been critical of
the scheme. The government was able to respond to the ongoing concerns about the scheme by
implementing the relatively limited recommendations of the PJCIS to, for example, include the
dataset within the text of the act (in s 187AA) and add clarifications that the obligations would
not require ISPs to collect details about web browsing or on use of services like webmail or
instant messaging that they did not directly provide.
B. NECESSITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY JUSTIFICATIONS
While the government's plans to introduce data retention obligations were framed in national
security rhetoric from the start, the extent to which the scheme was actually necessary was never
particularly well explained. Early in the debate, prior to December 2014, the agencies struggled
to respond to questions expressed in the mainstream media about the necessity of the new rules.
The scheme was referred to as the 'third tranche' of the government's national security agenda
after  expanded surveillance powers and new restrictions designed to  deal  with Australians
fighting abroad.
The law enforcement agencies early on provided little detail about their need for the scheme,
beyond asserting the importance of access to metadata for dealing with terrorist threats and
serious crime. Various representatives from ASIO, the AFP, the Australian Crime Commission
pointed to increasing pressures in dealing with data in modern surveillance and the fact that
access to metadata was a routine part of their investigative work, but these claims originally did
not resonate strongly in the face of sustained pressure to explain the type of data to be collected
and the purposes for which it would be used. On the relatively few occasions that they were
pressed, representatives of the agencies and the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) were
unable to provide specific evidence that current levels of access were inadequate, or that a
requirement to obtain a warrants would significantly interfere with their activities. The key
question about why warrantless access was required, on either national security justifications or
for the broader category of law enforcement activities that the scheme actually permits, went
largely unreported by the media.
The debate changed abruptly in December 2014, after the extremely high profile hostage siege in
Sydney  by  a  lone  gunman (ABC,  2014).  In  the  wake  of  the  siege,  Prime Minister  Abbott
intensified his appeals to national security concerns as a key priority. Abbott was at this time
struggling to maintain his grip on the leadership in the face of continuously declining opinion
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poll figures. Over this period, Abbott, Brandis, and representatives from ASIO, the AFP, and the
AGD began to put together a cohesive narrative about why this next tranche of national security
legislation was required as a matter of urgency. These calls reverberated through the national
media and built to a crescendo following the attacks on Charlie Hedbo workers in Paris in early
January 2015, and the arrest of two men on terrorism charges in Sydney, in February 2015.
From December through to March, the government also began adding to the national security
claims with much more clearly defined narratives about the key role of telecommunications data
in the investigation of other serious crimes – including charging a suspect in a prominent
murder investigation, arresting suspects involved in a major drug shipment, and investigating
child sexual abuse claims.
The effect of the substantial increase in the force of national security rhetoric is striking. Labor,
under Bill Shorten's leadership, became largely unable to publicly criticise data retention for
fear  of  appearing  weak  on  national  security.  The  lack  of  specificity  in  the  government's
justifications early on in the debates had allowed Labor some latitude to critique the scheme.
When it  was  first  introduced,  Shorten firmly  opposed a  new 'internet  tax'  that  would see
‘ordinary Australians […] treated as if they are criminals’ (Shorten, 2014). Labor's ability to
voice public criticism was necessarily muted, however, both on the basis of Labor's support for
national security and the fact that it had previously supported data retention in 2012.
But from December, the lack of specificity was exploited by the government to secure the act’s
passage. In the mass media, the government’s urgency to take some action on national security
issues substituted for the more pointed and complex questions about why, exactly, a warrantless
data retention scheme was necessary. A small number of critics in independent and technology
news outlets pointed out that the perpetrators of the Sydney and Paris attacks were already
known to law enforcement agencies – and therefore could have been adequately surveilled
under existing legal arrangements – but these dissenting voices were not amplified in more
mainstream outlets.
Meanwhile,  when pressed  on criticisms of  the  scope  of  the  proposed regime,  government
representatives were able to defer to the PJCIS committee, which was tasked with reviewing the
bill.  In committee,  too,  the national  security  rhetoric  increased.  When the PJCIS hearings
continued after the siege, the agencies were able to present a unified front about the importance
of access to telecommunications data in investigations. Opposition members sought to press the
government to provide greater detail, and expressed considerable frustration that the details
were complex and were not at any rate to be finalised before the committee was due to report in
late February. Government members of the committee increased the pressure at this stage;
Senator  Nikolic,  former  Attorney-General  Ruddock,  and  Committee  Chair  Tehan  MP,  in
particular, all well-known for advocacy on national security, provided strong defence for the
further  proposition  that  the  data  retention  bill  was  necessary  for  ensuring  access  to
telecommunications data. The advocates for data retention were emboldened after the siege,
and immediately began calling for even more extensive powers in the national media – in the
immediate  aftermath,  Ruddock and the AFP are  separately  quoted arguing for  a  five  year
retention period.
Before the committee had even released its report, the main political opposition to the bill was
essentially over. The increasing strength of the government's rhetoric on national security and
crime eventually forced the opposition into a corner. On 5 February, Shorten was still willing to
call  for delay and care in examining the bill,  noting that Labor was committed to national
security but committing to wait until the PJCIS report was handed down at the end of the
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month. Wedged into supporting national security policy, the Australian Labor Party was only
able to critique the process, not the substance, of the proposed data retention scheme. Shorten
worked over this period to try to defuse the escalating rhetoric, but was ultimately unsuccessful.
By 12 February, three weeks before the PJCIS report was due, the Labor opposition caucus had
reportedly come to the conclusion that opposing the bill would provide the embattled Prime
Minister with an opportunity to attack Labor and potentially revive his doomed leadership. 2
From this point on, it seemed certain that Labor would support the data retention bill, subject to
recommendations of the report.
The PJCIS report, released on 27 February 2015, came out in support of the bill with some
recommendations, and it was clear at this stage that the bill would have bipartisan support after
a set of relatively minor amendments. In essence, the government was able to navigate criticism
of the bill and progress it through parliament by focusing the attention of most media outlets on
issues  that  the  government  was able  to  adequately  resolve  – such as  the  inclusion of  the
proposed data set within the legislation – and by using media coverage of the Sydney siege and
the Paris attacks to fuel concern about national security. In doing so, more fundamental human
rights criticisms about the act were essentially sidestepped.
C. COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Australia's data retention act poses a clear threat to individual privacy in a way that is not clearly
justified under international law. While criticisms about the necessity and proportionality of the
act  were raised by a  range of  different  actors  during its  passage,  the government did not
ultimately need to prove its assertion that the act complied with human rights standards. We
suggest that a large part of the reason for this is that the vagueness and complexity of the
scheme meant that it was not well understood in the mainstream media. This in turn enabled
the government to secure support on the broad justifications without needing to justify the
details.
Ultimately, neither the necessity of data retention, nor the specific privacy protections to ensure
the scheme was a proportionate measure, were dealt with in any detail in the mainstream press.
Its necessity was effectively asserted, in general terms, by terror attacks in Sydney in December
2014 and in Paris in January 2015. The intense national security rhetoric deployed over this
period by the government and by the agencies on the importance of telecommunications data in
investigations stood in for any detailed explanation of the necessity of the particular measures
proposed in the bill. Meanwhile, when pressed on the safeguards for privacy, the government
was able to delay and defer responses – the detail about what content would be caught and what
agencies would have access was only provided in draft form, and the task of ensuring that the act
was proportionate was delegated to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence, the
executive judgment of the Minister, and a system of review by parliament.
When opposition was united around particular, easily understandable issues, the government
was  forced  to  make  some  concessions.  Most  particularly,  very  late  in  the  process,  the
government introduced a specific secret warrant scheme for access to journalists’ metadata.
Some critics, including the major journalists’  union, had been warning for months that the
scheme would better empower law enforcement agencies to track down journalists’  sources
without a warrant. It was only after bipartisan support for the bill had been announced that this
concern exploded in the mainstream media, in a storm that threatened to scuttle the bill. This
empowered Labor to demand changes, and the government responded with a warrant scheme
that applied only to journalists' metadata. While not necessarily satisfactory to media interests,
this was sufficient to again secure bipartisan support. The other concerns raised about the bill
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were not as well targeted, and the government was largely able to ignore or defer the issues. For
example, following the journalists, lawyers’ groups unsuccessfully sought exceptions to protect
their  clients’  legal  privilege,  but  these  concerns  came  too  late  in  the  process.  Similarly,
telecommunications providers still sought clarity on costs, but the government was able to delay
a decision until after the act was passed.
The most concerning issue with the final act, from the perspective of proportionality, is that the
extents of the scheme are vague and subject to ministerial discretion. Both the types of data to
be  collected  and  the  agencies  that  are  permitted  to  access  this  data  without  any  judicial
oversight are left to be determined by subordinate legislation. These concerns, however, were
never well articulated in the national debate. They were repeatedly raised by a set of clear
dissenting voices in independent and technology media outlets,  but they were not strongly
amplified in mainstream sources. Many legislative details were missing for much of the debate,
and when finally presented by the government, were complicated and difficult to understand.
This complexity was reflected in much of  the mainstream media coverage,  which tended -
perhaps understandably - to gloss over significant details and, in some cases, progressed on
incorrect assumptions about the operation of the scheme. While there were dissenting voices
present throughout the debate, it appears from our analysis that the government was ultimately
able  to  exploit  the  lack  of  clarity  in  its  own  legislation  in  its  favour.  The  PJCHR's
recommendations were, in the end, safely rejected by the government with no real political
fallout.
CONCLUSION
The Telecommunications  (Interception and Access)  Amendment  (Data Retention)  Act  was
passed by the Australian government in April 2015, and is due to be reviewed by the PJCIS
sometime in 2019 (s 187N). However, absent a high-profile court case or renewed vigour in the
public  debate,  it  is  unlikely that  a  review will  change much about Australia’s  current data
retention scheme. Our analysis of the mainstream media over the course of the passage of the
act  highlights  significant  shortcomings  in  the  legislative  process.  In  Australia,  where  the
legislature is primarily responsible for defining (and by implication, protecting) the rights of
individuals, we have shown that human rights concerns about mass data retention were poorly
ventilated in major policy fora. Ultimately, the government was able to pass the legislation with
very  little  interrogation of  its  claims that  data  retention is  necessary  to  maintain national
security. We suggest that this is particularly concerning in a system without a constitutional bill
of rights that is enforceable by an independent judiciary.
In Europe, similar data retention schemes have been found disproportionate to the objective of
fighting serious crime, even where that objective was deemed to be a legitimate objective of
general interest. Factors that compelled the ECJ to hold that a wide-ranging metadata retention
obligation  was  disproportionate  included  that  the  obligation  impacted  all  citizens  using
electronic communications services regardless of involvement in criminal activity and that there
was no requirement that law enforcement agencies obtain a warrant or seek prior review from a
court or independent administrative body before accessing a person’s metadata. In Australia,
similar shortcomings with the government’s data retention regime did not have any real impact
on the success of the act’s passage through parliament. Unlike in other jurisdictions, there is
little prospect that these concerns can be raised in any challenge to the validity of the act.
The government asserted, following terror attacks in Sydney in December 2014 and Paris in
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January 2015, that extensive data retention was necessary to protect national security. This
assertion was not effectively questioned by the Australian mainstream press. But even if data
retention is accepted as a necessary intrusion to maintain national security, the government has
not included protections to make it a proportionate measure. In this article we have raised
concerns about deficiencies in the act, including that the language of the act remains vague; the
scope for ministerial discretion about what metadata must be retained and which agencies may
access metadata is significant; and there is no judicial oversight before agencies may access
Australians’ private information.
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FOOTNOTES
1. In a judgment handed down on 21 December 2016 in the joined cases of Tele2 Sverige AB v
Post-och telestyrelsen (C203/15) and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Watson,
Brice and Lewis (C-698/15) (Tele2 Sverige), the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) confirmed that the Digital Rights Ireland decision, together with article 15(1) of
Directive 2002/58/EC as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC and read in light of articles 7, 8,
11 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, precluded "national
legislation which, for the purpose of fighting crime, provides for general and indiscriminate
retention of all traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all
means of electronic communication" (Tele2 Sverige [112], [134]). The ECJ further held that
national legislation governing the protection and security of traffic and location data, and the
access of that data by competent national authorities, would be precluded where it was not
restricted solely to fighting serious crime, where access was not subject to prior review by a
court or an independent administrative authority, and where there was no requirement that the
data should be retained within the European Union ([125], [134]). The Tele2 Sverige decision
arose from two separate cases concerning the scope of national data retention legislation in
Sweden (Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen, Kammarrätten i Stockholm (Administrative
Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Sweden) 29 April 2015) and England (The Queen v Secretary of
State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 2092). Both cases were referred to the ECJ for
clarification on the impact of Digital Rights Ireland as to general data retention legislation at a
national level.
2. Abbott was eventually deposed by Malcolm Turnbull in September 2015:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-14/malcolm-turnbull-beats-tony-abbott....
